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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Travis William Coats appeals from the district court’s judgment entered 
upon his guilty plea to felony driving under the influence.  On appeal, Coats 
argues the district court committed clear error when it found he gave both 
express and implied consent to the blood draw.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
Coats drove his black jeep into the back of a stopped minivan.  (12/18/15 
Tr., p. 4, L. 11 – p. 7, L. 17, p. 13, L. 18 – p. 14, L. 15.)1  The minivan was 
stopped at a stop light.  (12/18/15 Tr., p. 4, L. 11 – p. 7, L. 17.)  Coats did not 
attempt to brake or to stop before he hit the minivan.  (Id.)   
When the police arrived, Officer Messenger observed that Coats was very 
lethargic and slow moving.  (12/18/15 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 17-24.)  Coats’ speech was 
slurred and he had a hard time following directions.  (Id.)  Officer Messenger 
gave Coats a standard traffic statement form to fill out, but Coats was unable to 
fill out the form.  (12/18/15 Tr., p. 14, L. 25 – p. 17, L. 1; Ex. 1.)   
Officer Kelly arrived and observed that Coats’ speech was slurred, his 
responses were lethargic and he appeared to have a hard time responding to 
questions.  (12/18/15 Tr., p. 26, L. 5 – p. 27, L. 13.)  Officer Kelly did not smell 
any alcohol on Coats.  (12/18/15 Tr., p. 27, Ls. 21-22.)  When Coats got out of 
                                            





his car he was unable to keep his balance.  (12/18/15 Tr., p. 27, L. 23 – p. 34, 
L. 6.)   
Officer Kelly attempted to conduct field sobriety tests.  (Id.)  Officer Kelly 
was able to conduct the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, and noticed a lack of 
smooth pursuit in Coats’ eyes.  (Id.)  However, Coats was unable to start the 
walk-and-turn test because he would stumble and nearly fall.  (Id.)  Officer Kelly 
did not have Coats attempt the one-leg stand because Coats was having 
difficulty keeping his balance.  (5/3/16 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 8-15.)  Officer Kelly placed 
Coats under arrest for DUI.  (5/3/16 Tr., p. 13, Ls. 16-23.)   
Coats was transported to the Twin Falls County Jail and Coats submitted 
to a breathalyzer test.  (12/18/15 Tr., p. 34, L. 23 – p. 35, L. 13.)  The breath test 
did not show the presence of any alcohol.  (Id.)  Officer Kelly attempted to get a 
Drug Recognition Expert to examine Coats, but none were available.  (12/18/15 
Tr., p. 35, Ls. 14-18.)   
Officer Kelly advised Coats of his Miranda2 rights.  (12/18/15 Tr., p. 35, 
L. 19 – p. 36, L. 8.)  Coats indicated that he did not want to speak to Kelly.  (R., 
p. 197.)  Officer Kelly then asked Coats if he would consent to a blood draw and, 
after a discussion regarding the blood draw, Coats agreed to go to the hospital 
for a blood draw.  (See R., pp. 197-198.) 
The district court transcribed a portion of the interaction between Coats 
and Officer Kelly: 
 
                                            
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).  
 
 3 
Kelly:  Would you be willing to let the hospital draw blood so 
that we can do a blood test to see what is in your system? 
 
Coats:  Is that necessary? 
 
Kelly:  I think you’re on something – okay? I think you’ve 
taken something, obviously, that’s impairing your ability to function.  
 
Coats:  Yeah. 
 
Kelly:  [A]nd you were driving and you got in an accident.  
 
Coats:  Yep.  
 
Kelly:  I mean you did a lot of damage…so I want to know 
what caused that because I think that there’s something in your 
system that’s causing you to act the way you are.  I just want to 
know what that is.  There’s two ways I can find out, you can tell 
me…Just be honest with me man.  
 




Kelly:  So if we go to the hospital and I ask the nurse to draw 
your blood, would you be willing to allow her to draw your blood so I 
can test it to see exactly how much Soma you have in your system. 
 
Coats:  Yeah. 
 
Kelly:  You would? Okay. 
 
Coats:  That would help me out.  
 
Kelly:  Well, it would help the situation out for, you know, 
figuring out exactly what it is.  I can’t say necessarily it would help 
you out or help me out.  It’s just the course of action that we would 




(Id. (ellipses in original)3.)   
 
Officer Kelly took Coats to the hospital for a blood draw.  (12/18/15 Tr., 
p. 36, L. 9 – p. 39, L. 15; Ex. 2.)  At the hospital, Coats gave written consent to 
the blood draw.  (5/3/16 Tr., p. 20, Ls. 7-17; R. p. 198.)  Coats’ blood was drawn 
and sent to the forensic lab for testing.  (12/18/15 Tr., p. 36, L. 9 – p. 39, L. 15; 
Ex. 2.)  The blood test concluded that Coats’ blood contained the drugs 
Carisoprodol, Meprobamate, and Diazepam.  (Id.)   
The state charged Coats with felony DUI, because Coats had a prior 
felony DUI.  (R., pp. 74-76.)  Coats filed a motion to suppress, arguing that 
Officer Kelly continued questioning him in violation of his Miranda rights and, 
thus, his statements to police and his consent to the blood draw should be 
suppressed.  (R., pp. 108-124.)  The state responded and agreed that 
statements made by Coats in response to any custodial interrogation, after he 
invoked Miranda, should be suppressed.  (See R., pp. 175-182.)  However, the 
state objected to the suppression of the blood test results because Coats gave 
valid voluntary consent to the blood test.  (Id.)   
                                            
3 This is the colloquy as transcribed by the district court in the Memorandum 
Decision and Order.  (See R., pp. 197-198.)  As noted by the district court this 
colloquy is based upon Exhibit A, the recording of the interaction between Officer 
Kelly and Coats.  (R., p. 197, n. 3.)  The district court’s transcription uses ellipses 
to reflect portions of the colloquy not transcribed.  The appellant uses his own 
transcription and omits and summarizes different parts of the colloquy (see 
Appellant’s brief, pp. 2-5), and it is not clear whether appellant is challenging the 
district court’s transcription.  However, the portions transcribed by the district 
court do not conflict with the audio recording.  (See Ex. A at 51:44 to 54:40.)  
Therefore, respondent will rely upon the transcription made by the district court 
because it is the district court’s factual finding as to what was said and it contains 




The district court held a hearing on Coats’ motion to suppress.  (R., 
pp. 192-193.)  Officer Kelly testified that, if Coats had denied consent, he would 
have sought a warrant for the blood draw.  (5/3/16 Tr., p. 24, L. 9 – p. 25, L. 17.)  
After the hearing, the district court granted Coats’ motion in part and denied the 
motion in part.  (R., pp. 194-210.)  The district court held that the statements 
made by Coats after his invocation of Miranda should be suppressed.  (Id)  
However, the district court denied Coats’ motion to suppress the blood test 
results because Coats gave both express and implied consent to the blood draw.  
(Id.)   
Coats entered a conditional guilty plea to felony DUI and reserved the 
right to appeal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 254-
264, 268-270.)  The district court entered judgment and sentenced Coats to eight 
years with four years fixed and retained jurisdiction.  (R., pp. 339-344.)  Coats 





Coats states the issues on appeal as: 
 
1. SHOULD THE DISTRICT COURT HAVE SUPPRESSED 
THE TEST RESULTS OF THE WARRANTLESS BLOOD DRAW 
OF COATS? 
 
a. DID COATS REVOKE HIS IMPLIED CONSENT BY 
SAYING NO, TWICE, INDICATING THAT HE DID 
NOT WANT TO TALK WITH OFFICER KELLY? 
 
b. DID COATS OBJECT TO THE BLOOD DRAW BY 
SAYING NO, TWICE, INDICATING THAT HE DID 
NOT WANT TO TALK WITH OFFICER KELLY? 
 
c. DID OFFICER KELLY’S CONTINUED 
INTERROGATION NOT ONLY VIOLATE COATS’ 
FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS BUT HIS FOURTH 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS AS WELL? 
 
d. DID OFFICER KELLY’S CONTINUED 
INTERROGATION AMOUNT TO POLICE 
MISCONDUCT? 
 
e. IF SO, WAS THE POLICE MISCONDUCT SUCH 
THAT THE TEST RESULTS OF THE BLOOD DRAW 
SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 5.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Coats failed to show the district court committed clear error when it 





Coats Has Failed To Show The District Court Committed Clear Error When It 




Coats told Officer Kelly he would take a blood test and again gave 
consent when he signed a consent form at the hospital.  (R., p. 208.)  The district 
court found that Coats gave both express and implied consent to the blood draw.  
(R., pp. 202-208.)  On appeal Coats argues that the district court committed clear 
error when it found that his express consent was voluntary because Officer Kelly 
asked for consent after Coats invoked his Miranda rights and because Coats’ 
intoxication made him vulnerable at the time he gave consent.  (See Appellant’s 
brief, pp. 10-13.)  Coats also argues that his invocation of his right to remain 
silent also revoked his implied consent to a blood draw.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 13-16.)  Coats’ arguments are not supported by the law and constitute a 
request for this Court to simply reweigh the evidence before the district court.  
The district court’s finding that Coats gave voluntary consent is supported by 
substantial evidence and thus was not in error.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The Idaho appellate courts review a district court’s order on a motion to 
suppress evidence using a bifurcated standard of review.  State v. Wulff, 
157 Idaho 416, 418, 337 P.3d 575, 577 (2014) (citing State v. Purdum, 
147 Idaho 206, 207, 207 P.3d 182, 183 (2009)).  The appellate court accepts the 
trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but freely reviews 
 
 8 
the trial court’s application of constitutional principals in light of those facts.  Id.  
(citing Purdum, 147 Idaho at 207, 207 P.3d at 183).   
 
C. The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Coats’ Motion To Suppress 
The Results Of The Blood Draw 
 
The district court found that Coats gave both express and implied consent 
to the blood draw.  (R., pp. 202-208.)  Coats gave oral consent to the blood draw 
and then gave additional written consent when he was taken to the hospital.  (R., 
p. 208.)   
As has been noted, Coats orally consented to the blood draw while 
in the Twin Falls County Jail.  He was then taken to the hospital 
where another written authorization form was read to him, and he 
signed it.  Thus, he also consented, some 20-30 minutes after the 




The district court concluded by holding that, after reviewing the evidence, 
there was no evidence that the blood test was coerced or otherwise illegal.  (R., 
p. 208.) 
As such, Coats provided not just implied consent, but also actual 
consent immediately before the test was performed.  
 
Having listened to the recording of his transportation to the 
hospital, and to the discussion with the nurse before the test, there 
was no evidence that the test was coerced or otherwise illegal.  As 
such, the results of the test will be admissible at trial.  
 
(Id.)   
 
 On appeal, Coats argues that the district court’s factual finding that his 
consent was voluntary was clearly erroneous.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-16.)  
Contrary to Coats’ argument, the district court did not err.   
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 1. Coats Gave Actual Voluntary Consent To The Blood Draw 
 
Coats argues on appeal that his actual consent was not voluntary, 
claiming that Officer Kelly engaged in “flagrant and personal” misconduct and 
that Coats was vulnerable because he was on drugs.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 11-13 (“So, contrary to the District Court’s findings, you do have someone 
who is on something, who is vulnerable, and the intent and purpose clearly is to 
get Coats’ consent for a blood draw.”)4.)  Coats’ argument on appeal is a request 
for this Court to reweigh the district court’s factual findings of voluntary consent.  
The district court did not commit clear error.  The district court correctly found, 
based on a totality of the circumstances, that Coats gave actual consent to the 
blood draw.   
“Warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.”  State v. Lutton, 161 Idaho 556, __, 388 P.3d 71, 
75 (Ct. App. 2017) (citing Wulff, 157 Idaho at 419, 337 P.3d at 578).  Consent to 
the search is one of the well-recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement 
and can overcome the presumption of unreasonableness.  Id.  “Consent must be 
voluntary and not the result of duress or coercion, either direct or implied.” Id. 
(citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248 (1973); State v. Whiteley, 
124 Idaho 261, 264, 858 P.2d 800, 803 (Ct. App. 1993)).  Whether consent is 
 
                                            
4 It appears, that after this sentence, Coats’ argument in his brief shifts from an 
argument regarding actual consent to an argument regarding implied consent.  
(See Appellant’s brief, p. 13 (“In terms of revocation of implied consent…”).)  
Coats’ implied consent argument will be addressed in the section below.  
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voluntary is based upon the totality of the circumstances.  Id. (citing Wulff, 
157 Idaho at 422, 337 P.3d at 581).  An individual’s consent is involuntary “if his 
will has been overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically 
impaired.”  State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 778, 152 P.3d 645, 649 (Ct. App. 
2006) (quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225).  “To determine whether a 
subject’s will was overborne in a particular case, the court must assess ‘the 
totality of all the surrounding circumstances—both the characteristics of the 
accused and the details of the interrogation.’”  Id. (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. 
at 226).   
“Accordingly, whether consent was granted voluntarily, or was the product 
of coercion, is a factual determination to be based upon the surrounding 
circumstances, accounting for subtly coercive police questions and the possibly 
vulnerable subjective state of the party from whom consent is elicited.”  Id. (citing 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 229; State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 
1052, 1057 (2003); State v. Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97, 137 P.3d 481, 484 
(Ct. App. 2006); State v. Dominguez, 137 Idaho 681, 683, 52 P.3d 325, 327 
(Ct. App. 2002)).  “Importantly, the trial court is the proper forum for the ‘careful 
sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case’ necessary in 
determining voluntariness.”  Id. 143 Idaho at 778–79, 152 P.3d at 649–50 (citing 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 233).  “Even if the evidence is equivocal and somewhat 
in dispute, if the trial court’s finding of fact is based on reasonable inferences that 
may be drawn from the record, it will not be disturbed on appeal, since our 
standard of review requires that we accept a trial court’s factual findings unless 
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they are clearly erroneous.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “Findings will not be deemed 
clearly erroneous if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record.”  Id. 
(citing State v. Benson, 133 Idaho 152, 155, 983 P.2d 225, 228 (Ct. App. 1999); 
Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97, 137 P.3d at 484). 
The district court found “there was no coercion applied by [Officer] Kelly at 
the time he asked Coats to provide a blood sample.”  (R., pp. 205-206.)  The 
district court found that Officer Kelly did not use subtly coercive police tactics nor 
was Coats in a vulnerable state.  (Id.)   
The discussion between [Officer] Kelly and Coats was 
conducted in conversational tones.  [Officer] Kelly was direct with 
Coats, but not overbearing or threatening.  Coats’s speech was 
discernible to the court, and he asked questions of [Officer] Kelly 
which were answered in a straightforward and candid manner.  
[Officer] Kelly made no false assertions to Coats regarding his 
authority or his intent to obtain a warrant.  Once [Officer] Kelly 
confirmed that Coats was asserting his Miranda rights [Officer] 
Kelly simply said, “Okay, would you be willing to let the hospital 
draw blood so that we can do a blood test to see what is in your 
system?”  Coats then asks if that is necessary, and [Officer] Kelly 
answers the question frankly, indicating that he suspects Coats is 
“on something.”  (Def.’s Ex. A.) 
 
 Shortly thereafter Coats admits that he was on Soma, (a 
statement which is inadmissible at trial), but at no time does Coats 
indicate that he does not want to provide the test.  After agreeing to 
take the test Coats even states:  “That would help me out.”  Id.  The 
officer candidly then tells Coats that “it would help that situation out 
for, you know, figuring out what exactly it is.  I can’t say necessarily 
it would help you out or help me out.  It’s just the course of action 
that we would want to do.”  Id.  Thus [Officer] Kelly, rather than 
lying to or prevaricating with Coats, answers Coats’s questions 
openly and honestly. 
 




Coats challenges these factual findings on appeal.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 11-13.5)  However, the district court’s factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous because they are based on substantial evidence in the record.  Officer 
Kelly testified at both the preliminary hearing and the suppression hearing.  (See 
R., pp. 124-148; 5/3/16 Tr., p. 7, L. 13 – p. 32, L. 5.)  The district court also 
based its factual findings on the audio recording of Officer Kelly’s interactions 
with Coats.  (See R., p. 197, n. 3 (citing Ex. A.).)  The audio recording confirms 
the district court’s factual findings that the discussion between Officer Kelly and 
Coats was conducted in conversational tones and Officer Kelly was not 
overbearing or threatening.  (See Ex. A.)  The audio recording also shows that 
Coats’ speech was discernible, that he was aware of his surroundings, and that 
he asked Officer Kelly relevant questions.  (See id.)  Officer Kelly answered 
Coats’ questions openly, honestly and in a straightforward and candid manner.  
(See id.)   
                                            
5 Coats’ claim of police misconduct is based upon the faulty premise that once a 
suspect invokes his or her right to remain silent the police and suspect can no 
longer talk to each other at all.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 10-13.)  As more fully 
described in the following section, an invocation of the right to remain silent only 
prevents the police from asking questions reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.  See, infra, § I(C)(2). A request for consent to a blood 
draw is not a question reasonably calculated to elicit an incriminating response.  
See, infra, § I(C)(2).  In response to the request for a blood draw, Coats asked 
questions and engaged Officer Kelly in discussion.  (See R., pp. 197-198.)  
Therefore, it is likely that Coats’ post-Miranda statements were not the product of 
an illegal custodial interrogation and should not have been suppressed.  See, 
e.g., State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 795-796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1056-1057 (2003).  
However, the state did not challenge that determination below (see R., p. 200), 
so it will not be challenged on appeal.   
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Coats’ appellate brief simply disagrees with the district court’s conclusion 
and interpretation of the evidence.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 11-13.)  The Idaho 
Court of Appeals’ recent opinion in Lutton articulated the well-established 
principal that the district court, and not the appellate court, is the proper forum for 
the determination of findings of fact.  
Lutton’s arguments are unpersuasive in that they ignore the district 
court’s express findings and implicitly urge this Court to reweigh the 
evidence presented during the suppression hearing. It is well 
established that we give great deference to the trial court with 
regard to findings of fact. The trial court is the proper forum for the 
“careful sifting of the unique facts and circumstances of each case” 
necessary in determining voluntariness. Even though the evidence 
may be equivocal and somewhat in dispute, if the trial court’s 
findings of fact are based on reasonable inferences that may be 
drawn from the record, they will not be disturbed on appeal.  
 
Lutton, 161 Idaho at __, 388 P.3d at 77 (internal citations omitted).  Coats, like 
Lutton, is simply asking this Court to reweigh the evidence presented to the 
district court.  Coats’ appellate argument, like Lutton’s, is unpersuasive.   
Coats also argues that a violation of Miranda requires the suppression of 
the blood test results as fruit of the poisonous tree.  (See Appellant’s brief, 
pp. 14-15 (“The consent obtained was based upon the violation of Miranda.  The 
fruit of the poisonous tree, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), was 
the basis for the consent.”).)  Contrary to Coats’ argument, a violation of Miranda 
does not require suppression of the physical fruits of the suspect’s statements, 
when those statements are voluntary.  Garcia, 143 Idaho at 781–782, 152 P.3d 
at 652–653 (citing United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 636–637 (2004)).  The 
Idaho Court of Appeals cited the United States Supreme Court:   
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[T]he Miranda rule is a prophylactic employed to protect 
against violations of the Self–Incrimination Clause. The Self–
Incrimination Clause, however, is not implicated by the admission 
into evidence of the physical fruit of a voluntary statement. 
Accordingly, there is no justification for extending the Miranda rule 
to this context. And just as the Self–Incrimination Clause primarily 
focuses on the criminal trial, so too does the Miranda rule. The 
Miranda rule is not a code of police conduct, and police do not 
violate the Constitution (or even the Miranda rule, for that matter) 
by mere failures to warn. For this reason, the exclusionary rule 
articulated in such cases as Wong Sun does not apply. 
 
Id. (quoting Patane, 542 U.S. at 636-637).   
Here, the exclusionary rule does not apply because Coats gave voluntary 
consent to the blood draw.  See id. (“Garcia’s consent to search his vehicle was 
voluntary and not the product of police coercion, the exclusionary rule does not 
apply.  Consequently, we hold that the physical evidence obtained by the police 
upon searching Garcia’s truck with his voluntary consent is not suppressible as 
fruit of the poisonous tree.”); see also Woodward v. State, 142 Idaho 98, 107, 
123 P.3d 1254, 1263 (Ct. App. 2005) (“In other words, with regard to physical 
evidence later discovered, there is no such thing as ‘fruit of the poisonous 
Miranda violation.’”) (citing Patane, 542 U.S. at 636-637).   
Coats’ claim that the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine applies to 
Miranda violations is not supported in law.  The district court’s factual findings 
that Coats gave voluntary express consent to the blood draw is supported by 
substantial evidence, and Coats has failed to show the district court committed 




2. Coats Also Gave Implied Consent To The Blood Draw6 
 
In addition to establishing the consent exception through the actual, 
voluntary consent of an individual, the State can also establish consent through 
statutorily implied consent.  See State v. Rios, 160 Idaho 262, 266, 371 P.3d 
316, 320 (2016) (“[I]mplied consent may satisfy the consent exception to the 
warrant requirement. Therefore actual consent is not required.”). A driver 
impliedly consents to evidentiary testing, including blood alcohol testing, when 
that person drives on Idaho roads, and a police officer has reasonable grounds 
to believe that person has been driving in violation of one of Idaho’s DUI 
statutes.  Lutton, 161 Idaho at __, 388 P.3d at 75-76 (citing I.C. § 18–8002(1); 
Rios, 160 Idaho at 265, 371 P.3d at 319).  “However, to be deemed valid, a 
driver’s implied consent must remain voluntary until the point when the 
evidentiary test is administered.” Id. (citing Rios, 160 Idaho at 265–66, 371 P.3d 
at 319-20).  “Thus, for the implied consent exception to apply (1) the driver must 
give his or her initial consent voluntarily, and (2) the driver must continue to give 
voluntary consent through the time of evidentiary testing.”  Id. (citing Rios, 
160 Idaho at 266, 371 P.3d at 320).   
                                            
6 Since Coats gave actual consent, both orally and in writing, to the blood draw, it 
may not be necessary to examine whether he also gave implied consent.  See 
Rios, 160 Idaho at 267, 371 P.3d at 321 (“Where ... a suspect is presented with 
a consent form for a blood draw, he or she is faced with two options: (1) sign the 
form and give actual consent for the blood draw, or (2) refuse to sign, withdraw 
implied consent, and accept any penalties for such a refusal under the implied 
consent statute.”); see also State v. Ortega-Vastida, ___ Idaho ___, 392 P.3d 
42, 45 n.1 (Ct. App. 2017), review denied (Apr. 18, 2017).  By signing the 
consent form, Coats gave actual consent.  However, in addition to express 





Here, Coats gave his initial consent to evidentiary testing by voluntarily 
driving on Idaho roads.  (See R., p. 204.)  Coats does not challenge this finding 
on appeal.  The district court found that, considering the totality of the 
circumstances, Coats gave implied consent to the blood draw.  (See R., pp. 200-
207.)  “Coats never refused to give the test, he never protested giving the test, 
and he never objected to giving the test.”  (R., p. 207.)   
On appeal, Coats argues that his invocation of his Miranda rights 
amounted to a revocation of implied consent.  (See Appellant’s brief, pp. 13-16.)  
Coats characterizes his argument as follows: 
In terms of revocation of implied consent, if an individual says I 
don’t want to talk, the no means I don’t want to talk to you.  No 
more conversation.  If consent is not given to talk, how can the 
same words be construed to leave further conversation and a blood 
draw on the table? 
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 13.)  Coats’ argument is not supported by law.   
 
“[T]he standard for evaluating a waiver of Miranda rights is distinct from 
the standard for evaluating consent under the Fourth Amendment.”  Rios, 
160 Idaho at 267, 371 P.3d at 321 (citing Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 241-246).  
Thus, as the district court correctly pointed out, Coats’ argument “conflates the 
two standards and seeks to equate the invocation of the right to remain silent 
with a revocation of consent for a blood draw.”  (R., p. 203.)  Coats’ invocation of 
his Miranda rights does not revoke his implied consent to evidentiary testing.   
Further, the premise of Coats’ argument is incorrect.  An invocation of 
Miranda does not preclude “further conversation” between an officer and a 
suspect.  An invocation of Miranda only prevents an officer from interrogating a 
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suspect, which means asking questions that are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.  See, e.g., State v. Salato, 137 Idaho 260, 267-268, 
47 P.3d 763, 770-771 (Ct. App. 2001). “Miranda v. Arizona requires that a 
person be informed of his or her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination prior to custodial interrogation; otherwise, incriminating statements 
are inadmissible.”  Id. (citing State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 
1018 (2002)).  “A person is interrogated whenever subjected to express 
questioning or its functional equivalent, i.e. anything reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.” Id. (citing State v. Frank, 133 Idaho 364, 370, 986 P.2d 
1030, 1036 (Ct. App. 1999); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-302 
(1980)).  Thus, when the questions are not reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response, there is no interrogation and, thus, no Miranda violation.  
See id. (holding that a question regarding towing the defendant’s car was not 
interrogation because it was not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating 
response).   
As the district court correctly pointed out, Officer Kelly’s request that 
Coats submit to a blood test is not a question that is “reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.”  (R., p. 204.)  Because such request is not a question 
likely to elicit an incriminating response and is thus not an impermissible 
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.  See United States v. Hidalgo, 
7 F.3d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1993) (a consent to search is not an incriminating 
statement); United States v. Rodriguez–Garcia, 983 F.2d 1563, 1568 (10th Cir. 
1993) (“Every federal circuit court which has addressed the Miranda issue 
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presented here has reached the conclusion that a consent to search is not an 
incriminating statement.”); United States v. Lewis, 921 F.2d 1294, 1303 (D.C. 
Cir. 1990) (every federal circuit which has addressed the issue has held that 
officer does not have to issue Miranda warnings before asking permission to 
search); United States v. Glenna, 878 F.2d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 1989) (every 
federal circuit that has addressed the issue has found that a request for consent 
is not a violation of Miranda); Smith v. Wainwright, 581 F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir. 
1978) (a consent to search is not a self-incriminating statement); State v. Rippe, 
193 P.3d 1215, 1222-1223 (Haw. Ct. App. 2008) (“The vast majority of courts 
that have considered the issue, including this court, has concluded that a request 
for consent to search does not constitute interrogation.”); 4 Wayne R. LaFave, 
Search and Seizure § 8.2(j) (5th ed. 2016) (if a defendant is arrested and 
invokes his or her Miranda rights it does not prohibit the police from requesting 
consent to search).  Therefore, Coats’ argument that it was improper for Officer 
Kelly to request a blood draw after Coats invoked Miranda is not supported by 
law.7  As cited above, the district court’s finding that Officer Kelly did not coerce 
Coats’ consent is supported by substantial evidence in the record.   
As with express consent, Coats simply disagrees with the district court’s 
factual findings and requests this Court reweigh the evidence.  As such, Coats’ 
                                            
7 While Coats argues it was improper for Officer Kelly to request a blood draw 
after Coats invoked Miranda, Coats’ own brief concedes, “Where an officer 
inquires whether a suspect will submit to blood-alcohol test, such has been 
deemed not to be an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.”  (Appellant’s 




arguments on appeal fail.  The district court properly found that Coats never 
revoked his implied consent to the blood draw.   
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s 
judgment. 
 DATED this 6th day of June, 2017. 
 
       
 __/s/ Ted S. Tollefson_______ 
      TED S. TOLLEFSON 
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